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overwhelming need to address security as the primary factor to achieving sustainable stability in the aftermath of conflict. The consequences of not establishing security immediately are televised throughout the world and used to the advantage of those elements that thrive in this environment of lawlessness and plant the seeds of insurgencies. Despite this knowledge, the use of law enforcement organizations to prevent or reduce the impact of insurgency has been greatly ignored by military strategists. Failing to recognize the unique qualities that military and civilian law enforcement bring to bear on the environment of an insurgency lead to over application of maneuver-centric approaches when considering the proper force to apply for restoration of security and order among indigenous populations. This paper explores options and provides recommendations for the use and employment of Police and Security professionals as a strategic alternative to current methodology to counter insurgency operations.
THE USE OF SECURITY PROFESSIONALS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
The use of law enforcement and security organizations to prevent or reduce the impact of insurgency has been greatly ignored by military strategists. Military planners often fail to recognize the unique capabilities and qualities that military and civilian law enforcement offer with regard to eliminating the causes of an insurgency, as opposed to meeting the insurgency head on with a show of force. Planners currently apply a maneuver-centric approach when considering the proper force to ensure restoration of security and order among indigenous populations. Whatever security that is achieved in this manner is one that is imposed on the population and often not sustainable when the occupying force (usually military) departs. To better understand the situation this paper will discuss the lawless environment and the power vacuum created by conflict, shows how this environment fuels an insurgency, and offer options for future military strategies incorporating police capability in countering insurgencies.
Insurgency
Webster defines insurgency "as a condition of revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government and is not recognized as belligerency." 1 Counterinsurgency is then defined by R. Scott Moore is "an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability." 2 Nations with large armed forces and capable intelligence agencies no longer fear encroachment from their neighbors but rather possible collateral damage from rogue elements who disregard recognized boundaries. Globalization, treaties, and economic well being have fostered a relatively stable and peaceful environment. Inside these borders, fragments of the population feel disenfranchised; they tend to express their dissatisfaction of the status quo through violence and other disruptive acts. 3 Conventional military forces are ill equipped to respond to this problem as it grows throughout the populace. In the twenty-first century insurgencies have and will continue to blend and influence the population of large urban areas globally.
Insurgencies thrive in power vacuums typically left following conflict. Often times social institutions, governments, and political officials have contributed to the chaotic environment by controlling a population through fear, and oppression, fostering a feeling of mistrust. The disillusioned population is vulnerable during this period of general lawlessness and is looking for an institution that will provide for their basic needs; security is paramount to this effort. Current strategies often focus on addressing the insurgency as it evolves instead of preventing the conditions which enable it and which thus feed destabilizing forces. Establishing security in the short run to avert chaos and prevent criminal and or insurgent forces from securing a foothold in society, while concurrently restoring basic services, is key in facilitating a sustainable stability. This time period has been referred to as the "golden hour"
The current situation in Iraq clearly reveals the benefits that could have been realized had the planning efforts included a more comprehensive approach to the establishing of lawful social order following the US invasion. 5 Galula asserts that the object of revolutionary war or an insurgency is the population itself. Insurgents are trying to win the population over and the counterinsurgency is trying to sustain the people's loyalty to the established regime. Galula states that these objectives are political in nature. Insurgencies are protracted wars. As Galula observes, "It takes time for a small group of insurgent leaders to organize a revolutionary movement, to raise and develop armed forces, to a balance with the opponent and to overpower him". 6 States countering insurgencies must recognize that defeating the insurgency is not just a military problem. As insurgent groups seek to gain the world's attention they sometimes endorse legitimate causes for the purpose of persuading the populace to support them. Over time this strategy may work and then the insurgent group gains legitimacy through the use of policy. 7 To combat insurgencies, conventional armies must adapt to the challenges of the many elements that feed an insurgency: religion, ethnicity, race, economic, political exclusion, etc. Studies have shown that insurgencies on the average last ten years; 8 these years are marked with continued internal friction caused by violence and instability. Even in the case of some of the world's best equipped and resourced militaries, it is difficult to sustain public support and international approval of the counterinsurgency program for an extended period.
American soldiers are well trained and they can survive a variety of harsh conditions. But they are ill prepared to conduct community policing, especially in a highly charged religious or ethnically divided environment. In the current Iraqi environment our soldiers are challenged by their social expectations, because the government is based on the Koran and religion plays a more significant role in political decisions than Americans area accustomed to. Soldiers' first impressions in this environment form the basis for future relationships; these impressions are difficult to overcome, especially when they are negative. In Iraq, U.S. soldiers who were photographed along side looters and overzealous citizens, ignoring the looting, rioting and violence that occurred, quickly found that gaining the confidence of the average
Iraqi citizen proved extremely difficult. 9 In a United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Robert M. Perito asserts that "Responsibility for law and order fell to coalition military forces that were neither trained nor equipped to perform police functions. U.S.
soldiers complained they had not been trained to fight crime and should not be asked to make arrests." The report goes on to conclude that coalition forces developed an insensitivity to the violent Iraqi-on-Iraqi crime that was occurring. The negative impact of this apathetic attitude on Iraqi citizens was immeasurable, but clearly evidenced in the pervading attitudes on the streets, in the neighborhoods, and in the media reports.
Since the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) was unable to protect the Iraqi public and the coalition forces seemed indifferent to the welfare of the Iraqi citizen, an ever emerging insurgency was fed. had been disbanded since it was wrought with government supported corruption. Public safety was nowhere to be found. 11 Islamic fundamentalist seeking to expel the infidel Americans from their land seized this opportunity to spread death and terror among the average citizens. Iraqi citizens became vulnerable to anyone with a gun and a bomb strapped to their body. (They could choose to support the radical movement and enjoy some level of security, or choose not to support and fall victim to the terrorist tactics.)
Thus the insurgency is born.
Countering an Insurgency R. Scott Moore states "The ultimate objective of counterinsurgency strategy is lasting stability, but not one that is imposed and maintained by force or repression.
Stability must provide the structures necessary to peacefully address issues that may continue to arise; those structures must be understood, institutionalized, and fully accepted by the population, who now feel they benefit from them. 12 Moore also points out that "to be successful, counterinsurgencies must be perceived as legitimate.
Legitimacy within the conflict zone occurs when populations, and their leaders, understand that the counterinsurgency result benefit them more than the alternative." 13 "The government's legitimacy becomes a center of gravity target during an insurgency, meaning the insurgents will attempt to demonstrate that the state cannot guarantee security within its territory." 14 In, The Basics of Counterinsurgency , Moore also identifies six critical tasks of Counterinsurgency Strategy which identify a pathway for overcoming an insurgency.
They are:
Establish and Maintain Security: This task is broken into three subcomponents: restoring security; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and maintaining security. The re-establishment of basic public safety restores the confidence of the populace.. Local law enforce must be given the opportunity the gain back the public's trust. To gain trust and legitimacy local public safety agencies and defense forces must be given training if needed and the opportunity work independent of security forces.
Restoring security is manpower-intensive; it requires well trained personnel with situational and cultural awareness. Counterinsurgency warfare theorists in the twenty-first century will no doubt target the insurgents' use of the media and their ability coordinate their actions with large organized criminal elements located in big cities around the world. 22 Some insurgent groups are externally sponsored by sovereign states that seek to cause disorder and political instability in a neighboring country. This strategy offers an inexpensive way to avoid conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency forces must identify this threat and seek to neutralize its effects while minimizing the loss of life to their population. In some cases insurgent leaders will compete for the recruitment of new members by carrying out violent acts against innocent non-participants. These incidents then cause the populace to lose confidence in local enforcement's ability to protect them, then undermining the established authority.
Counter Insurgency Capability
Countering an insurgency requires forces and organizations capable of addressing the tenets described by Moore. Roles missions and responsibilities should be clearly outlined and understood by all organizations participating in the effort. Since security provides the basic foundation on which additional institutions and infrastructure can be built, it is logical to address its needs early on in the process. This enables a fledgling society emerging from conflict to take advantage of the "golden hour" and capitalize on emerging opportunities before to criminal and rogue elements gaining support. The composition of this force could vary from situation to situation, but the basic components would endure. As a minimum it must have the core principal of maintaining social order through legitimacy in the eyes of the population it intends to serve. Despite current U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is not necessarily the best tool to achieve long term success in this area.
Counterinsurgency theorist David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency
Warfare, Theory and Practice that, "conventional warfare has been thoroughly analyzed in the course of centuries indeed for almost the extent of recorded history and the process of Battle has sliced into distinct phases: march towards the enemy, test of the enemy's strength , exploitation of success, eventual retreat, etc" 23 Galula's point is that in training for conventional warfare, soldiers are not challenged to deal with the issues that are characteristics of an insurgency. Galula asserts that, "in counterinsurgency warfare a soldier's job is to help win the support of the population. Soldiers must also learn to engage in practical politics". 24 Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice was written in 1964 and base on Gulula's experiences in China, Greece, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, and his first hand experience in French counterinsurgency of Algeria.
As Galula points out, there are special skills and considerations that have proven effective in the past contributing in countering an insurgency through the use of military forces. These successes come at the hands of more specialized not general purpose forces. Special Operations and Civil Affairs soldiers train for operations in less permissive environments or, more specifically in environments where success is measured by the indigenous populations' ability to provide for, and self regulate its citizens.
US Special Operations Forces
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, elite, military units with special training and equipment. SOF train to infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy, specialized training. These units total roughly 34,000
Active and 15,000 Reserve personnel in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force, or about 2% of all U.S. active and reserve forces. This particular skill set is valuable for addressing the lawless environment in the aftermath of conflict, 26 focusing on training and assistance for government agencies trying to overcome subversion and hostile internal activities.
The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) deployed
Liaison Coodinations Elements (LCE) alongside Armed Forces Philippines(AFP)
soldiers to conduct counterinsurgency operations. 27 The LCE teams and the AFP exchanged subject matter experts, conducted, civil affairs projects, and psychological operations. The object of the joint operation was to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Abu Sapoyyaf Group (ASG), which had been terrorizing the Philippine people for almost twenty year since the group's founding. The benefit of addressing these new environments before allowing conditions to deteriorate to a point that direct kinetic action by conventional forces is necessary and cannot be ignored. Avoiding instability by creating and/ or supporting legitimate security institutions that can provide public security early on in a campaign must be addressed during planning, when appropriate stabilizing capabilities must be incorporated into the mission. The security needed for long term stability may initially be "imposed", which can be brought about through force and Martial Law, but it must be assured through long-term programs focused on sustainable security. Application and enforcement of acceptable social standards and conduct serve to offset the environmental conditions that promote an insurgency. This enforcement is best provided by trained professionals. Professionally trained, equipped and legitimate police provide the foundation for the rule of law. Without rule of law, illicit power structures, criminals, and insurgents will continue to thrive and undermine legitimate efforts to reconstitute and reconstruct countries emerging from conflict.
Military Planners for future engagements such as Iraq should seek to craft strategies that encompass the requirements for safety, security, and restoration of infrastructure. These basic elements collectively guarantee citizens basic social order and civil support. Planners must focus holistically on total social infrastructure requirements in order to form a comprehensive long term strategy that creates a sustainable peace, capable of outlasting the presence of occupation or "liberation"
forces. The starting point of this strategy must include stabilizing considerations that establish and promote security and the rule of law. Strategist must consider the formulation of a standing force or capability appropriate to the size of the indigenous population to provide for and later train legitimate indigenous law enforcement professionals.
Equal consideration should be given to parallel strategic efforts to address the need to provide the basic requirements of electricity, water and emergency services to the populace. These elements could be comprised of military personnel and contracted civilians with the special skills that it takes to restore an urban area.
Counterinsurgency warfare theory has found new life in the twenty-first century.
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fueled new interest in the old theories of last century.
B. H. Liddell Hart and David Galula are acknowledged as relevant today as they were when their books were first published. R. Scott Moore's "The Basic of
Counterinsurgency" offers contemporary insight on counterinsurgency strategy.
Twenty-first century warfare will be triggered by policy driven belligerents who avoid conventional warfare and seek to overthrow governments through violence. LTG David H. Petraeus supports this view in a recent Military Review essay:
The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are fighting and they clearly are the wars we must master. America's overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strength----firepower, maneuver technology----and come at us and our partners the way the insurgents do in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative, therefore, that we continue to learn from our experiences in those countries, both to succeed in those endeavors and to prepare for the future. 40 State-supported conventional forces are simply unable to defeat insurgencies using military means alone. Insurgents utilize the media and other technology to advance their cause and to network with other insurgent groups. Counterinsurgency warfare must adapt to the use of other than military strategies to influence the populace from sympathizing with the insurgent issues and becoming potential recruits.
41
Counterinsurgent forces must possess the skill sets required to set conditions for security in order to provide a foundation for long-term sustainable stability.
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